In this brief comment, the public choice theory 1 aims to distinguish the dilemmas and conflicts in formal and empirical. The hypothesis argues that the reality more complex than the principles of choice of Pareto and Liberalism*. Both the ethics and politics are taking decisions that are not always in line with the requirements of rationality and complete information.
Introduction
Externalities need collective decisions to protect the identity of agents and their differences. It is a prerequisite, not only in the markets, but in open and democratic societies 2 . However, these externalities are not met. Observe a public tender for contracts with the State in emerging countries, are transparent processes information and incentives for those who aspire to earn? It is not clear. Just as in the contracting state, a majority of collective choice processes fail in these conditions 3 . Presidential elections in Colombia, such as, can be decided by a simple majority vote, but the constitutional reforms introduced possibilities of coalitions between the first round losers. So they create conditions that allow for changes in voter preferences 4 .
In this sense, the policy also applies market allocation. In economic systems it is entirely impossible neutrality when making decisions that can affect everyone 5 . I like fruit for breakfast; you like eating bread with jam, a change in our preferences can offer a different social outcome even if the social alternatives available remain the same.
Then there can be no neutrality radical. Neutrality is not met; we are not indifferent toward our differences. Assuming you'd rather stay at home than going on holiday, being Σ the rest of the welfare state, while you have the opposite preference. The market model can guarantee you go on vacation. Otherwise I'd rather you stay home with his family (being Σ the rest of the welfare state), while you want the opposite in my case.
These are simply a substitution of alternatives. However, the market will motivates you go on vacation.
All of the above acts in the opposite of Rawlsian "veil of ignorance" 6 . The people's preferences are met by comparing the state of their welfare. Neutrality is not a superior force (as opposed to Max Weber)
Someone can take a Protestant conduct: do not believe in the market! Indeed, this is one of the shortcomings of the market mechanism, not being able to develop a comprehensive agenda on our "externalities." And not only in the cases mentioned, but in certain types of collective choice. In the midst of a march that was attacked by
African bees, what places offer greater security? Simplified preferences cut the nature of human behavior.
Liberal Values
In society we have preferences that seem to depend solely on people. Σ As everything else in society, Mr. A prefers the single life (x) and Σ being anything else, Mr. A is getting married (and), while many others prefer the opposite. It can be argued that the social choice between x and y is a purely private matter for Mr. A is the only one involved, while others can only be curious. However, according to Wittgenstein, it is also possible to see a set of rules that would put personal choice reflected in various language games 7 .
In its weakest sense, the condition of rationality states that everyone is absolutely critical in the social choice between at least a couple of alternatives, such as, that Mr. A is deciding between x and y. In general there may be one of these cases. The fact is that these conditions of rationality L* are finally incompatible with the conditions U (unrestricted domain) and P (weak Pareto principle), when placed upon an SDF, as shown by Sen (1970 The road taken reflects true preferences of social dilemmas. This is not only the limited capacity of choice but also the inability to make an optimal choice. In a dark street a thief assaults his victim: "money or your life." The conditions did not give to speculation. And trading in such situations is impossible. However, in this case is a real dilemma in extreme? Normal life often presents illustrations of lesser risk.
Limitations liberal
This critique of liberalism L* passed as a critique of solipsism 9 . The assumption that certain things-like states of knowledge-are matters "private and personal" is not The context that creates such conditions is related to the concepts developed by
Wittgenstein on the meaning of "rule-following" 11 . In the same way we learn a language, a rule allows us to understand the meaning of certain proscriptions: child pornography, pedophilia, or handling of marijuana. All these aspects make up rules for limiting some people over others. Politics as a device intended to regulate power 
Conclusions
Conflicts arising from the collective choice can limit the Pareto principle. Moreover, this principle is inapplicable in liberalism least unless we assume that individual preferences are reduced to certain specific patterns. But the Pareto principle P is adapted to the justifications of liberalism L*.
In the analytical expression of liberalism such Nozick, for example, freedom of choice is motivated by the P status of the person A, you can take interest in the affairs "personal" B, as a justification to consider it also a matter of A. Advocates of this position in the public choice also defend possessive individualism.
The importance of formal analysis is that it helps to look at issues not clear in the experience. However, formal systems are often not responding to the complexities of collective choice. Decisions on political or economic, are always loaded with personal bias. And a majority of situations present us with decisions that we can qualify, then (ex post), as the best in such conditions.
